By Gene Ogorodov
Several years ago shortly after the South Ossetian War I read a monograph from the Strategic Studies Institute on this conflict focusing on the Lessons Learned for the Russian Military. Although it was a short war that didn't settle much more than forcing Georgia to remain a clandestine partner of NATO rather than opening joining the Western Powers, it was quite telling about the balance of military power in the world.
The troubles the Russian Military faced were predictable given the chaos of the 1990s but, nonetheless, forced a re-evaluation of Russia's military strength. There were a significant number of units the Russian High Command deemed incapable of engaging in combat after Putin's reforms and years of COIN in Chechnya which forced Moscow to hobble together a strike force from all over the country. Furthermore, the Russian Air Force lost fighters to a country that had no air force. "The question," said the Russian Defense Minister, "is not whether Russia can penetrate the NATO air defense system, but an air defense system [sic]."
However, the Russian Army was capable of closing with the enemy. The Georgians were armed and trained and probably financed by the US and NATO, and they broke almost immediately upon contact. One thing this monograph didn't mention, that is something of an elephant in the room, this was the first time contemporary NATO doctrine had been tried without overwhelming technological, fire, and numerical superiority.
The Russians may have been a little bit rusty, but NATO doctrine might be impracticable. The failure of Iraq can (and probably should be) lain at the feet of the State Department. The failure of Afghanistan is only a failure because the current President insisted upon staying there too long. (As far as I can see it achieved everything it was intended to achieve--war profiteering.) But the failure of NATO doctrine is not something that should be ignored, and it mostly is being ignored.
There are several likely scenarios that could have resulted in the Georgian collapse which wouldn't tarnish NATO doctrine, one of which is that the Georgians were mixing NATO and Soviet doctrine which resulted in ubiquitous miscommunication. However, that cannot be assumed. It must be investigated, and the ubiquitous questions must be asked--Could the poor results of the War on Terror have a more fundamental problem than lack of communication between cabinet level departments?
Several years ago shortly after the South Ossetian War I read a monograph from the Strategic Studies Institute on this conflict focusing on the Lessons Learned for the Russian Military. Although it was a short war that didn't settle much more than forcing Georgia to remain a clandestine partner of NATO rather than opening joining the Western Powers, it was quite telling about the balance of military power in the world.
The troubles the Russian Military faced were predictable given the chaos of the 1990s but, nonetheless, forced a re-evaluation of Russia's military strength. There were a significant number of units the Russian High Command deemed incapable of engaging in combat after Putin's reforms and years of COIN in Chechnya which forced Moscow to hobble together a strike force from all over the country. Furthermore, the Russian Air Force lost fighters to a country that had no air force. "The question," said the Russian Defense Minister, "is not whether Russia can penetrate the NATO air defense system, but an air defense system [sic]."
However, the Russian Army was capable of closing with the enemy. The Georgians were armed and trained and probably financed by the US and NATO, and they broke almost immediately upon contact. One thing this monograph didn't mention, that is something of an elephant in the room, this was the first time contemporary NATO doctrine had been tried without overwhelming technological, fire, and numerical superiority.
The Russians may have been a little bit rusty, but NATO doctrine might be impracticable. The failure of Iraq can (and probably should be) lain at the feet of the State Department. The failure of Afghanistan is only a failure because the current President insisted upon staying there too long. (As far as I can see it achieved everything it was intended to achieve--war profiteering.) But the failure of NATO doctrine is not something that should be ignored, and it mostly is being ignored.
There are several likely scenarios that could have resulted in the Georgian collapse which wouldn't tarnish NATO doctrine, one of which is that the Georgians were mixing NATO and Soviet doctrine which resulted in ubiquitous miscommunication. However, that cannot be assumed. It must be investigated, and the ubiquitous questions must be asked--Could the poor results of the War on Terror have a more fundamental problem than lack of communication between cabinet level departments?
